ally prior to the true.

Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in
things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.

Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
_Ethic._ iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind.
Therefore the good is prior to the true.

_On the contrary,_ What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

_I answer that,_ Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from
the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the
true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true
must be prior in idea to the good.

Reply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills
the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the
object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the
intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable,
good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the
fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good
is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior
absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to
the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it
apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
things.

Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in
general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in dee