uth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."

_I answer that,_ Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the
intellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in
virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of
truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the
truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now
this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness,
through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth
varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of
opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in
another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in
either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there
is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and
the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth.
Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
before (Q. 14, A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is
immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it
is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect
changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which
natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in
so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
_Phys._ i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
because that truth does not remain which was before.

Reply Obj. 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are
said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said
to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth
of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect
with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes,
and consequently the