ich resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the
true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called
false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what
they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in
false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in
this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as
stated in _Metaph._ v, 34.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true
in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they
bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far
as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always
said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when
the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not
in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether There Is Falsity in the Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine
says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that
falsity is not in them.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity
is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.

Obj. 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor
false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do
not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no fals