e of what is desirable, so truth
is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in _De Anima_ iii that "the
soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
adds relation to the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as
said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible
with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect
is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested;
for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A.
1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the
intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the
intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because
truth and being differ in idea.

Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it
knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is
a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except
under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In
the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the
idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In
the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless
the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the
true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is
the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being
cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
understanding being.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 4]

Whether Good Is Logically Prior to the True?

Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from _Phys._
i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a
kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is
logic