hey are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge
of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him,
formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative
knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in
Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative
knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical
knowledge of all other things.
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QUESTION 15
OF IDEAS
(In Three Articles)
After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Ideas?
Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas
are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.
Therefore there are no ideas.
Obj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been
already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through
an idea; neither therefore other things.
Obj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of
knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient
principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore
necessary to suppose ideas.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless
they are understood."
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.
For the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are
understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things
themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing
itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of
which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be
in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is
clear for the following reason:
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of
any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of
the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the
agent
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