the Intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the
intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)
condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since
it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not
be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following,
"That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and
able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
not in the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in
so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.
Obj. 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself
more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is
from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
_I answer that,_ As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or
any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing
known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer
tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely
good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing
so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect
of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so
far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since
the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the
object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the
intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood
is said to be true in so
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