nt things.
Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true
conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
future thing is known by God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all
things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its
cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a
contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent
cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent
thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a
contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
knowledge of it. Now God kn
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