ith regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing
is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from
the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
"A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to
be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by
God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the
subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be
attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be
known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under
actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in
itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
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FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]
Whether God Knows Enunciable Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to
know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and
divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some
likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable
things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of
men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in
that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity
that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite
things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the
manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were
composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by
simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if
we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand
all that can be predicated of man.
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