of singular things in so far as they are
singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
singular things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man
are open to His eyes."

_I answer that,_ God knows singular things. For all perfections found
in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our
perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown
to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._
iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now
the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply
and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the
universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material
things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows
singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any
singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They
give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal
movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that
are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from
universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however
they may be joined together, are not individualized except by
individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or
because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that
kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence
according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in
their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge
extends as far as His causality exte