uren had promptly
issued a proclamation of neutrality. It is curious that in his several
replies to Seward's complaints Russell did not quote a letter from
Stevenson, the American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May
22, 1838. Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the
"Caroline" affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible
principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, as to
belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same ground,
and are governed by the same principles; that whenever a portion of a
State seek by force of arms to overthrow the Government, and maintain
independence, the contest becomes one _de facto_ of war[192]." This was
as exact, and correct, a statement of the British view as could have
been desired[193].
The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did not
then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July 2, 1861,
his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our side; of that I
have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of this.] But they
thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and as we seemed to have
made up our minds to it, that their Proclamation was just the thing to
keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned out otherwise
they did their best to correct their mistake[194]." The modern
historical judgment of the best American writers likewise exonerates the
British Government of "unfriendly animus[195]," but is still apt to
refer to the "premature" issue of the Proclamation.
This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the Government be
criticized even as exercising an unwise (not unfriendly) haste? Henry
Adams wrote that the British thought the "dissolution seemed inevitable"
and "we seemed to have made up our minds to it." Certainly this was a
justifiable conclusion from the events in America from Lincoln's
election in November, 1860, to his inauguration in March, 1861--and even
to a later date, almost in fact to the first week in April. During this
period the British Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy.
Then, suddenly, actual conflict begins and at once each side in America
issues declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and
piracy, indicative that _maritime_ war, the form of war at once most
dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in British
citizens, was the method first to be tried by the contestants.
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