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[Footnote 1: The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of
samavaya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance
and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sutrabha@sya II. ii. 13_)
that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different
things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with
either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that
another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavastha_).
Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to
remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of
_anavastha_--_prama@niki_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question
of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another
_aprama@niki anavastha_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of
anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

320

they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and samanya, Vis'e@sa they
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed
the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the
doctrine of _asatkaryavada_. This is just the opposite of the
Sa@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nabhavo
vidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never be
produced (_nasato vidyate bhavah_). The objection to this view is
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible
things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The
Nyaya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced
was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mima@msa that an unseen power resides in the
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for
there is no reason to suppose