ously to external objects. Apart from this no samanya
can be pointed out as being externally perceptible
--_Samanyadusanadikprasarita_--in _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_. The Vedanta
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know
jati as a separate substance. So it discards jati. See _Vedantaparibhasa_,
_Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabha_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's
_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]
[Footnote 2: Similarity (sadrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,
for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati
tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam_).]
319
is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the
yogins who can perceive them.
_Samavaya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation
by virtue of which two different things such as substance and
attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana
(cause) and karya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified
that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.
This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why
substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance
and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they
are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place
between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected
and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put
my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances
and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by
virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya
however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and
gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as
one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a
separate and independent category. This is not regarded as
many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because
it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed
but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being
by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].
These six things are called the six padarthas or independent
realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.
The Theory of Causation.
The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that
view of things which finds expression in our language, and which
we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus
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