nnot get beyond, or behind it. It has no pedigree. It
admits of no analysis. It is not a relation constituted by the
coalescence of an objective and a subjective element. It is not a state
or modification of the human mind. It is not an effect which can be
distinguished from its cause. It is not brought about by the presence of
antecedent realities. It is positively the FIRST, with no forerunner.
The perception-of-matter is one mental word, of which the verbal words
are mere syllables. We impose upon ourselves, and we also falsify the
fact, if we take any other view of it than this. Thus speaks metaphysic,
though perhaps not always with an unfaltering voice.

Psychology, or the science of the human mind, teaches a very different
doctrine. According to this science, the perception of matter is a
secondary and composite truth. It admits of being analysed into a
subjective and an objective element--a mental modification called
perception on the one hand, and matter _per se_ on the other. It is an
effect induced by real objects. It is not the first _datum_ of
intelligence. It has matter itself for its antecedent. Such, in very
general terms, is the explanation of the perception of matter which
psychology proposes.

Psychology and metaphysics are thus radically opposed to each other in
their solutions of the highest problem of speculation. Stated concisely,
the difference between them is this:--psychology regards the perception
of matter as susceptible of analytic treatment, and travels, or
endeavours to travel, beyond the given fact: metaphysic stops short in
the given fact, and there makes a stand, declaring it to be all
indissoluble unity. Psychology holds her analysis to be an analysis of
things. Metaphysic holds the psychological analysis to be an analysis
of sounds--and nothing more.

These observations exhibit, in their loftiest generalisation, the two
counter doctrines on the subject of perception. We now propose to follow
them into their details, for the purpose both of eliciting the truth and
of arriving at a correct judgment in regard to the reformation which Dr
Reid is supposed to have effected in this department of philosophy.

The psychological or analytic doctrine is the first which we shall
discuss, on account of its connexion with the investigations of Dr
Reid,--in regard to whom we may state, beforehand, our conclusion and
its grounds, which are these:--that Reid broke down in his philosophy,
both polem