ysic to do
this, inasmuch as "our apprehension of the perception of matter" is a
different fact from "the perception of matter itself." The former is, in
the estimation of metaphysic, susceptible of analysis--the latter is
not. Metaphysic thus escapes the imputation of leading us into
subjective idealism. This will become more apparent as we proceed.

"Our apprehension of the perception of matter,"--this, then, is the
whole given fact with which metaphysic has to deal. And this fact
metaphysic proceeds to analyse into a subjective and an objective
factor--giving to the human mind that part of the _datum_ which belongs
to the human mind, and withholding from the human mind that part of the
_datum_ to which it has no proper or exclusive claim. But at what point
in the _datum_ does metaphysic insert the dissecting knife, or introduce
the solvent which is to effect the proposed dualisation? At a very
different point from that at which psychology insinuates her
"ineffectual fire." Psychology cuts down between perception and matter,
making the former subjective and the latter objective. Metaphysic cuts
down between "our apprehension"--and "the perception of matter;" making
the latter, "the perception of matter," totally objective, and the
former, "our apprehension," alone subjective. Admitting, then, that the
total fact we have to deal with is this, "our apprehension of the
perception of matter"--the difference of treatment which this fact
experiences at the hand of psychology and metaphysic is this:--they both
divide the fact; but psychology divides it as follows;--"Our
apprehension of the perception of"--that is the subjective part of the
_datum_--the part that belongs to the human mind;--"Matter _per se_" is
the objective part of the _datum_, the part of the _datum_ which exists
independently of the human mind. Metaphysic divides it at a different
point, "our apprehension of:" this, according to metaphysic, is the
subjective part of the process--it is all which can with any propriety
be attributed to the human mind:--"the perception of matter," this is
the objective part of the _datum_--the part of it which exists
independently of the human mind--and to the possession of which the
human mind has no proper claim--no title at all.

Before explaining what the grounds are which authorise metaphysic in
making a division so different from the psychological division of the
fact which they both discuss, we shall make a few remark