erence, that whereas the psychological
doctrine teaches that the exercise of the senses is the condition upon
which we are permitted to apprehend objective material things--the
metaphysical doctrine teaches that the exercise of the senses is the
condition upon which we are permitted to apprehend or participate in the
objective perception of material things. There is no real difficulty in
the question just raised; and therefore, with this explanatory hint, we
leave it, our space being exhausted.

Anticipations of this doctrine are to be found in the writings of every
great metaphysician--of every man that ever speculated. It is announced
in the speculations of Malebranche--still more explicitly in those of
Berkeley; but though it forms the substance of their systems, from
foundation-stone to pinnacle, it is not proclaimed with sufficiently
unequivocal distinctness by either of these two great philosophers.
Malebranche made the perception of matter totally objective, and vested
the perception in the Divine mind, as we do. But he erred in this
respect: having made the perception of matter altogether objective, he
analysed it in its objectivity into perception (_idee_) and matter _per
se_. We should rather say that he attempted to do this: and of course he
failed, for the thing, as we have shown, is absolutely impossible.
Berkeley made no such attempt. He regarded the perception of matter as
not only totally objective, but as absolutely indivisible; and therefore
we are disposed to regard him as the greatest metaphysician of his own
country--(we do not mean Ireland; but England, Scotland, and
Ireland)--at the very least.

When this elaborate edition of Reid's works shall be completed--shall
have received its last consummate polish from the hand of its
accomplished editor--we promise to review the many important topics
(partly philosophical and partly physiological) which Sir William
Hamilton has discussed in a manner which is worthy of his own great
reputation, and which renders all compliment superfluous. We are assured
that the philosophical public is waiting with anxious impatience for the
completion of these discussions. In the mean time, we heartily recommend
the volume to the student of philosophy as one of the most important
works which our higher literature contains, and as one from which he
will derive equal gratification and instruction, whether he agrees with
its contents or not.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] _The Works