ed. All
that he believes to be his (or subjective) is _his participation in_ the
perception of this object. In a word, it is the perception of matter,
and not matter _per se_, which is the _kind_ of matter, in the
independent and permanent existence of which man rests and reposes his
belief. There is no truth or satisfaction to be found in any other
doctrine.

This metaphysical theory of perception is a doctrine of pure
intuitionism: it steers clear of all the perplexities of
representationism; for it gives us in perception only one--that is, only
a proximate object: this object is the perception of matter,--and this
is one indivisible object. It is not, and cannot be, split into a
proximate and a remote object. The doctrine, therefore, is proof against
all the cavils of scepticism. We may add, that the entire objectivity of
this _datum_ (which the metaphysical doctrine proclaims) makes it proof
against the imputation of idealism,--at least of every species of absurd
or objectionable idealism.

But what are these objective perceptions of matter, and to whom do they
belong? This question leads us to speak of the circumstance which
renders the metaphysical doctrine of perception so truly valuable. This
doctrine is valuable chiefly on account of the indestructible foundation
which it affords to the _a priori_ argument in favour of the existence
of God. The substance of the argument is this,--matter is the perception
of matter. The perception of matter does not belong to man; it is no
state of the human mind,--man merely participates in it. But it must
belong to some mind,--for perceptions without an intelligence in which
they inhere are, inconceivable and contradictory. They must therefore be
the property of the Divine mind; states of the everlasting intellect;
_ideas_ of the Lord and Ruler of all things, and which come before us as
_realities_,--so forcibly do they contrast themselves with the
evanescent and irregular ideas of our feeble understandings. We must,
however, beware, above all things, of regarding these Divine ideas as
_mere_ ideas. An idea, as usually understood, is that from which all
reality has been abstracted; but the perception of matter is a Divine
idea, from which the reality has not been abstracted, and from which it
cannot be abstracted.

But what, it will be asked--what becomes of the senses if this doctrine
be admitted? What is their use and office? Just the same as
before,--only with this diff