not? Does its existence depend upon our
existence, or has it a being altogether independent of us?
Now that, and that alone, is the point to decide which our natural
belief should be appealed to; but Dr Reid did not see this. His appeal
to the conviction of common sense was premature. He appealed to this
belief without allowing scepticism and idealism to run their full
course; without allowing them to confound the psychological analysis,
and thus bring, us back to a better condition by compelling us to accept
the fact, not as given in the spurious analysis of man, but as given in
the eternal synthesis of God. The consequence was, that Reid's appeal
came to naught. Instead of interrogating our belief as to the objective
existence of the perception of matter, (the proper question,) the
question which he brought under its notice was the objective existence
of matter _per se_--matter _minus_ perception. Now, matter _per se_, or
_minus_ perception, is a thing which no belief will countenance. Reid,
however, could not admit this. Having appealed to the belief, he was
compelled to distort its evidence in his own favour, and to force it, in
spite of itself, to bear testimony to the fact which he wished it to
establish. Thus Dr Reid's appeal not only came to naught, but being
premature, it drove him, as has been said and shown, to falsify the
primitive convictions of our nature. Scepticism must indeed be terrible,
when it could thus hurry an honest man into a philosophical falsehood.
The question, then, which we have to refer to our natural belief, and
abide the answer whatever it may be, is this:--Is the perception of
matter (taken in its integrity, as it must be taken,) is it a
modification of the human mind, or is it not? We answer unhesitatingly
for ourselves, that _our_ belief is, that it is not. This "confession of
faith" saves us from the imputation of subjective idealism, and we care
not what other kind of idealism we are charged with. We can think of no
sort of evidence to prove that the perception of matter is a
modification of the human mind, or that the human mind is its proper and
exclusive abode: and all our belief sets in towards the opposite
conclusion. Our primitive conviction, when we do nothing to pervert it,
is that the perception of matter is not, either wholly, or in part, a
condition of the human soul; is not bounded in any direction by the
narrow limits of our intellectual span, but that it "dwells apar
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