ticable.
The superiority of metaphysic, then, does not consist in doing, or in
attempting more than psychology. It consists in seeing that psychology
proposes to execute, the impossible, (a thing which psychology does not
herself see, but persists in attempting;) and it consists, moreover, in
refraining from this audacious attempt, and in adopting a humbler, a
less adventurous, and a more circumspect method. Metaphysic (viewed in
its ideal character) aims at nothing but what it can fully overtake. It
is quite a mistake to imagine that this science proposes to carry a man
beyond the length of his tether. The psychologist, indeed, launches the
mind into imaginary spheres; but metaphysic binds it down to the fact,
and there sternly bids it to abide. _That_ is the profession of the
metaphysican, considered in his beau-ideal. That, too, is the practice
(making allowance for the infirmities incident to humanity, and which
prevent the ideal from ever being perfectly realised)--the practice of
all the true astronomers of thought, from Plato down to Schelling and
Hegel. If these philosophers accomplish more than the psychologist, it
is only because they attempt much less.

In taking up the problem of perception all that metaphysic demands is
the _whole_ given fact. That is her only postulate. And it is
undoubtedly a stipulation which she is justly entitled to make. Now,
what is, in this case, the _whole_ given fact? When we perceive an
object, what is the whole given fact before us? In stating it, we must
not consult elegance of expression: the whole given fact is this,--"We
apprehend the perception of an object." The fact before us is
comprehended wholly in that statement, but in nothing short of it. Now,
does metaphysic give no countenance to an analysis of this fact? That is
a new question--a question on which we have not yet touched.
Observe,--the fact which metaphysic declares to be absolutely
unsusceptible of analysis is "the perception of matter." But the fact
which we are now considering is a totally different fact: it is _our
apprehension of_ the perception of matter--and it does not follow that
metaphysic will also declare this fact to be ultimate and
indecompoundable. Were metaphysic to do this, it would reduce us to the
condition of subjective or egoistic idealism. But metaphysic is not so
absurd. It denies the divisibility of the one fact; but it does itself
divide the other. And it is perfectly competent for metaph