ndicate it? He faced about and appealed boldly to our
instinctive and irresistible _belief_ in its independent existence.

The crisis of the strife centres in this appeal. In itself, the appeal
is perfectly competent and legitimate. But it may be met, on the part of
the sceptic and idealist, by two modes of tactic. The one tactic is
weak, and gives an easy triumph to Dr Reid: the other is more
formidable, and, in our opinion, lays him prostrate.

_The first Sceptical Tactic._ In answer to Dr Reid's appeal, the sceptic
or idealist may say, "Doubtless we have a belief in the independent
existence of matter; but this belief is not to be trusted. It is an
insufficient guarantee for that which it avouches. It does not follow
that a thing is true because we instinctively believe it to be true. It
does not follow that matter exists because we cannot but believe it to
exist. You must prove its existence by a better argument than mere
belief."--This mode of meeting the appeal we hold to be pure trifling.
We join issue with Dr Reid in maintaining that our nature is not rooted
in delusion, and that the primitive convictions of common sense, must be
accepted as infallible. If the sceptic admits that we _have_ a natural
belief in the independent existence of matter, there is an end to him:
Dr Reid's victory is secure. This first tactic is a feeble and mistaken
manoeuvre.

_The Second Sceptical Tactic._ This position is not so easily turned.
The stronghold of the sceptic and idealist is this: they deny the
primitive belief to which Dr Reid appeals to be _the fact_. It is not
true, they say, that any man believes in the independent existence of
matter. And this is perfectly obvious the moment that it is explained.
Matter in its _independent_ existence, matter _per se_, is matter
disengaged in thought from all perception of it present or remembered.
Now, does any man believe in the existence of such matter?
Unquestionably not. No man by any possibility can. What the matter is
which man really believes in shall be explained when we come to speak of
the metaphysical solution of the problem--perhaps sooner. Meanwhile we
remark that Dr Reid's appeal to the conviction of common sense in favour
of the existence of matter _per se_, is rebutted, and in our opinion
triumphantly, by the denial on the part of scepticism and idealism that
any such belief exists. Scepticism and idealism not only deny the
independent existence of matter, but they