their starting-point the
analysis of the perception of matter. He errs, by himself, in
maintaining that there is a belief where no belief exists.

But do not scepticism and idealism doubt matter's existence
_altogether_, or deny to it _any_ kind of existence? Certainly they do;
and in harmony with the principle from which they start they must do
this. The _only_ kind of matter which the analysis of the perception of
matter yields, is matter _per se_. The existence of such matter is, as
we have shown, altogether uncountenanced either by consciousness or
belief. But there is no other kind of matter in the field. We must
therefore either believe in the existence of matter _per se_, or we must
believe in the existence of _no_ matter whatever. We do not, and we
cannot believe in the existence of matter _per se_; therefore, we cannot
believe in the existence of matter at all. This is not satisfactory, but
it is closely consequential.

But why not, it may be said--why not cut the knot, and set the question
at rest, by admitting at once that every man _does_, popularly speaking,
believe in the existence of matter, and that he practically walks in the
light of that belief during every moment of his life? This observation
tempts us into a digression, and we shall yield to the temptation. The
problem of perception admits of being treated in _three_ several ways:
_first_, we may ignore it altogether,--we may refuse to entertain it at
all; or, _secondly_, we may discuss it in the manner just proposed--we
may lay it down as gospel that everyman does believe in the existence of
matter, and acts at all times upon this conviction, and we may expatiate
diffusely over these smooth truths; or, _thirdly_, we may follow and
contemplate the subtle and often perplexed windings which reason takes
in working her way through the problem--a problem which, though
apparently clearer than the noonday sun, is really darker than the
mysteries of Erebus. In short, we may _speculate_ the problem. In
grappling with it, we may trust ourselves to the mighty current of
_thinking_, with all its whirling eddies,--certain that if our thinking
be genuine objective thinking, which deals with nothing but
_ascertained_ facts--it will bring us at last into the haven of truth.
We now propose to consider which of these modes of treating the problem
is the best; we shall begin by making a few remarks upon the _second_,
for it was this which brought us to a stand, and