the discussion had conducted us was
this; that the existence of matter could not be believed in _at all_.
The psychological analysis necessarily lands us in this conclusion: for
the psychological analysis gives us, for matter, nothing but matter _per
se_. But matter _per se_ is what no man does or can believe in. We are
reluctant to reiterate the proof; but it is this: to believe in the
existence of matter _per se_ is to believe in the existence of matter
liberated from perception; but we, cannot believe in the existence of
matter liberated from perception, for no power of thinking will liberate
matter from perception; therefore, we cannot believe in the existence of
matter _per se_. This argument admits of being exhibited in a still more
forcible form. We commence with an illustration. If a man believes that
a thing exists as one thing, he cannot believe that this same thing
exists as another thing. For instance, if a man believes that a tree
exists as a tree, he cannot believe that it exists as a house. Apply
this to the subject in hand. If a man believes that matter exists as a
thing _not_ disengaged from perception, he cannot believe that it exists
as a thing _disengaged_ from perception. Now, there cannot be a doubt
that the _only_ kind of matter in which man believes is matter _not_
disengaged from perception. He therefore cannot believe in matter
_disengaged_ from perception. His mind is already preoccupied by the
belief that matter is _this one thing_, and, therefore, he cannot
believe that it is _that other thing_. His faith is, in this instance,
forestalled, just as much as his faith is forestalled from believing
that a tree is a house, when he already believes that it is a tree.

There are two very good reasons, then, why we cannot believe in the
existence of matter at all, if we accept as our starting point the
psychological analysis. This analysis gives us, for matter, matter _per
se_. But matter _per se_ cannot be believed in; 1st, because the
condition on which the belief depends cannot be complied with; and,
2dly, because the matter which we _already_ believe in is something
quite different from matter _per se_. In trying to believe in the
existence of matter _per se_, we always find that we are believing in
the existence of _something else_, namely, in the existence of matter
_cum perceptione_. But it is not to the psychological analysis that we
are indebted for this matter, which is something else than