matter _per
se_. The psychological analysis does its best to annihilate it. It gives
us nothing but matter _per se_,--a thing which neither is nor can be
believed in. We are thus prevented from believing in the existence of
_any_ kind of matter. In a word, the psychological analysis of the
perception of matter necessarily converts who embrace it into sceptics
or idealists.

In this predicament what shall we do? Shall we abandon the analysis as a
treacherous principle, or shall we, with Dr Reid, make one more stand in
its defence? In order that the analysis may have fair play we shall give
it another chance, by quoting Mr Stewart's exposition of Reid's
doctrine, which must be regarded as a perfectly faithful
representation:--"Dr Reid," says Mr Stewart, "was the first person who
had courage to lay completely aside all the common _hypothetical_
language concerning perception, and to exhibit _the difficulty_, in all
its magnitude, by a plain _statement of the fact_. To what, then, it may
be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this; that the mind is
so formed that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense, by
external objects, are _followed_ by corresponding sensations, and that
these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of
matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote,)
are _followed_ by a perception of the existence and qualities of the
bodies by which the impressions are made;--that all the steps of this
process are equally incomprehensible."[25] There are at least two points
which are well worthy of being attended to in this quotation. _First_,
Mr Stewart says that Reid "exhibited the difficulty of the problem of
perception, in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of fact." What
does that mean? It means this; that Reid stated, indeed, the fact
correctly--namely, _that_ external objects give rise to sensations and
perceptions, but that still his statement did not penetrate to the heart
of the business, but by his own admission, left the difficulty
undiminished. What difficulty? The difficulty as to _how_ external
objects give rise to sensations and perceptions. Reid did not undertake
to settle that point--a wise declinature, in the estimation of Mr
Stewart. Now Mr Stewart, understanding, as he did, the philosophy of
causation, ought to have known that every difficulty as to _how_ one
thing gives rise to another, is purely a difficulty of the mind's
crea