tion, and not of nature's making, and is, therefore, no difficulty
at all. Let us explain this,--a man says he knows _that_ fire explodes
gunpowder; but he does not know _how_ or by what means it does this.
Suppose, then, he finds out the means, he is still just where he was; he
must again ask how or by what means these discovered means explode the
gunpowder; and so on _ad infinitum_. Now the mind may quibble with
itself for ever, and _make_ what difficulties it pleases in this way;
but there is no _real_ difficulty in the case. In considering any
sequence, we always know the _how_ or the means as soon as we know the
_that_ or the fact. These means may be more proximate or more remote
means, but they are invariably given either proximately or remotely
along with and in the fact. As soon as we know _that_ fire explodes
gunpowder, we know _how_ fire explodes gunpowder,--for fire is itself
the means which explodes gunpowder,--the _how_ by which it is ignited.
In the same way, _if_ we knew that matter gave rise to perception, there
would be no difficulty as to _how_ it did so. Matter would be itself the
means which gave rise to perception. We conceive, therefore, that Mr
Stewart did not consider what he was saying when he affirmed that Reid's
plain statement of facts exhibited _the difficulty_ in all its
magnitude. If Reid's statement _be_ a statement of fact, all difficulty
vanishes,--the question of perception is relieved from every species of
perplexity. If it _be_ the fact that perception is consequent on the
presence of matter, Reid must be admitted to have explained, to the
satisfaction of all mankind, _how_ perception is brought about. Matter
is itself the means by which it is brought about.

_Secondly_, then--Is it the fact that matter gives rise to perception?
That is the question. Is it the fact that these two things stand to each
other in the relation of antecedent and consequent? Reid's "plain
statement of fact," as reported by Mr Stewart, maintains that they do.
Reid lays it down as a fact, that perceptions _follow_ sensations, that
sensations _follow_ certain impressions made on our organs of sense by
external objects, which stand first in the series. The sequence, then,
is this--1_st_, Real external objects; 2_d_, Impressions made on our
organs of sense; 3_d_, Sensations; 4_th_, Perceptions. It will simplify
the discussion if we leave out of account Nos. 2 and 3, limiting
ourselves to the statement that real o