_is_ no object of belief. Dr Reid's appeal,
therefore, goes for nothing. He has put into the witness-box a
nonentity. And scepticism and idealism are at any rate for the present
reprieved. But do not scepticism and idealism go still further in their
denial--do they not extend it from a denial in the existence of matter
_per se_, to a denial in the existence of matter altogether? Yes, and
they must do this. They can only deal with the matter which the
psychological analysis affords. The only kind of matter which the
psychological analysis affords is matter _per se_, and it affords this
as all matter whatsoever. Therefore, in denying the existence of matter
_per se_, scepticism and idealism must deny the existence of matter out
and out. This, then, is the legitimate _terminus_ to which the accepted
analysis conducts us. We are all, as we at present stand, either
sceptics or idealists, every man of us. Shall the analysis, then, be
given up? Not if it can be substantiated by any good plea: for _truth_
must be accepted, be the consequences what they may. Can the analysis,
then, be made good either by observation or by reasoning,--the only
competent authorities, now that belief has been declared _hors de
combat_? Stewart says that Reid made it good by means of direct
observation; but the claim is too ridiculous to be listened to for a
single instant. We have also shown that reasoning is incompetent to make
out and support the analysis; and therefore our conclusion is, that it
falls to the ground as a thing altogether impracticable as well as
false, and that the attempt to re-establish it ought never, on any
account, to be renewed.

* * * * *

We have dwelt so long on the exposition of the psychological or analytic
solution of the problem of perception, that we have but little space to
spare for the discussion of the metaphysical doctrine. We shall unfold
it as briefly as we can.

The principle of the metaphysical doctrine is precisely the opposite of
the principle of the psychological doctrine. The one attempts all
analysis; the other forbears from all analysis of the given fact--the
perception of matter. And why does metaphysic make no attempt to dissect
this fact? Simply because the thing cannot be done. The fact yields not
to the solvent of thought: it yields not to the solvent of observation:
it yields not to the solvent of belief, for man has no belief in the
existence of matter from whi