er. Abstract thinking, then, equally with direct observation,
refuses to lend any support to the analysis; for a thing cannot be said
to be analysed when it is merely multiplied or repeated, which is all
that abstract thinking does in regard to the perception of matter. The
matter _per se_, which abstract thinking supposes that it separates from
the perception of matter, is merely an iteration of the perception of
matter.

Our conclusion therefore is, that the analysis of the perception of
matter into the two things, perception and matter (the ordinary
psychological principle), must, on all accounts, be abandoned. It is
both treacherous and impracticable.

Before proceeding to consider the metaphysical solution of the problem,
we shall gather up into a few sentences the reasonings which in the
preceding discussion are diffused over a considerable surface. The
ordinary, or psychological doctrine of perception, reposes upon an
analysis of the perception of matter into two separate things,--a
modification of our minds (the one thing) consequent on the presence of
matter _per se_, which is the other thing. This analysis inevitably
leads to a theory of representative perception, because it yields as its
result a proximate and a remote object. It is the essence of
representationism to recognise both of these as instrumental in
perception. But representationism leads to scepticism--for it is
possible that the remote or real object (matter _per se_), not being an
object of consciousness, may not be instrumental in the process.
Scepticism doubts its instrumentality, and, doubting its
instrumentality, it, of course, doubts its existence; for not being an
object of consciousness, its existence is only postulated in order to
account for something which _is_ an object of consciousness, viz.
perception. If, therefore, we doubt that matter has any hand in bringing
about perception, we, of course, doubt the existence of matter. This
scepticism does. Idealism denies its instrumentality and existence. In
these circumstances what does Dr Reid do? He admits that matter _per se_
is not an object of consciousness; but he endeavours to save its
existence by an appeal to our natural and irresistible belief in its
existence. But scepticism and idealism doubt and deny the existence of
matter _per se_, not merely because it is no object of consciousness,
but, moreover, because it is no object of belief. And in this they are
perfectly right. It