e
perception of it. Observation always gives the perception of matter as
the _first_ term in the series, and not matter itself. To pretend (as
Reid and Stewart do) that observation can go behind perception, and lay
hold of matter before it has given rise to perception--this is too
ludicrous a doctrine to be even mentioned; and we should not have
alluded to it, but for the countenance which it has received from the
two great apostles of common sense.

This last bold attempt, then, on the part of Reid and Stewart (for
Stewart adopts the doctrine which he reports) to prop their tottering
analysis on direct observation and experience, must be pronounced a
failure. Reid's "plain statement of fact" is not a _true_ statement of
_observed_ fact; it is a vicious statement of _conjectured_ fact.
Observation depones to the existence of the perception of matter as the
first _datum_ with which it has to deal, but it depones to the existence
of nothing anterior to this.

But will not abstract thinking bear out the analysis by yielding to us
matter _per se_ as a legitimate inference of reason? No; it will do
nothing of the kind. To make good this inference, observe what abstract
thinking must do. It must bring under the notice of the mind matter _per
se_ (No. 1) as something which is _not_ the perception of it (No. 2):
but whenever thought tries to bring No. 1 under the notice of the mind,
it is No. 2 (or the perception of matter) which invariably comes. We may
ring for No. 1, but No. 2 always answers the bell. We may labour to
construe a tree _per se_ to the mind, but what we always _do_ construe
to the mind is the perception of a tree. What we want is No. 1, but what
we always get is No. 2. To unravel the thing explicitly--the manner in
which we impose upon ourselves is this:--As explanatory of the
perceptive process, we construe to our minds _two number twos_, and one
of these we _call_ No. 1. For example, we have the perception of a tree
(No. 2); we wish to think the tree itself (No. 1) as that which gives
rise to the perception. But this No. 1 is merely No. 2 over again. _It_
is thought of as the perception of a tree, _i. e._ as No. 2. We _call_
it the tree itself, or No. 1; but we _think_ it as the perception of the
tree, or as No. 2. The first or explanatory term (the matter _per se_)
is merely a repetition in thought (though called by a different name) of
the second term--the term to be explained--viz. the perception of
matt