bjects precede perceptions. This
is declared to be a fact--of course an _observed_ fact; for a fact can
with no sort of propriety be called a fact, unless some person or other
has _observed_ it. Reid "laid completely aside all the common
_hypothetical_ language concerning perception." His plain statement (so
says Mr Stewart) contains nothing but facts--facts established, of
course, by observation. It is a fact of observation then, according to
Reid, that real objects precede perceptions; that perceptions follow
when real objects are present. Now, when a man proclaims as fact such a
sequence as this, what must he first of all have done? He must have
observed the antecedent _before_ it was followed by the consequent; he
must have observed the cause out of combination with the effect;
otherwise his statement is a pure hypothesis or fiction. For instance,
when a man says that a shower of rain (No. 1), is followed by a
refreshed vegetation (No. 2), he must have observed both No. 1 and No.
2, and he must have observed them as two separate things. Had he never
observed any thing but No. 2 (the refreshed vegetation), he might form
what conjectures he pleased in regard to its antecedent, but he never
could lay it down _as an observed fact_, that this antecedent was a
shower of rain. In the same way, when a man affirms it to be a fact of
observation (as Dr Reid does, according to Stewart) that material
objects are _followed_ by perceptions, it is absolutely necessary for
the credit of his statement that he should have observed this to be the
case; that he should have observed material objects before they were
followed by perceptions; that he should have observed the antecedent
separate from the consequent: otherwise his statement, instead of being
complimented as a plain statement of fact, must be condemned as a
tortuous statement of hypothesis. Unless he has observed No. 1 and No. 2
in sequence, he is not entitled to declare that this is an observed
sequence. Now, did Reid, or did any man ever observe matter anterior to
his perception of it? Had Reid a faculty which enabled him to catch
matter before it had passed in to perception? Did he ever observe it, as
Hudibras says, "undressed?" Mr Stewart implies that he had such a
faculty. But the notion is preposterous. No man can observe matter prior
to his perception of it; for his observation of it presupposes his
perception of it. Our observation of matter _begins_ absolutely with th