nterest' aroused, 'attention' turned, 'eyes' employed, etc.)
that were closely connected with it and that now recur and evermore
recur with unbroken vividness, though from the pen of now, which may be
only an image, all such vividness may have gone;

3. That these feelings are the nucleus of 'me';

4. That whatever once was associated with them was, at least for that
one moment, 'mine'--my implement if associated with hand-feelings, my
'percept' only, if only eye-feelings and attention-feelings were
involved.

The pen, realized in this retrospective way as my percept, thus figures
as a fact of 'conscious' life. But it does so only so far as
'appropriation' has occurred; and appropriation is _part of the content
of a later experience_ wholly additional to the originally 'pure' pen.
_That_ pen, virtually both objective and subjective, is at its own
moment actually and intrinsically neither. It has to be looked back upon
and _used_, in order to be classed in either distinctive way. But its
use, so called, is in the hands of the other experience, while _it_
stands, throughout the operation, passive and unchanged.

If this pass muster as an intelligible account of how an experience
originally pure can enter into one consciousness, the next question is
as to how it might conceivably enter into two.

III

Obviously no new kind of condition would have to be supplied. All that
we should have to postulate would be a second subsequent experience,
collateral and contemporary with the first subsequent one, in which a
similar act of appropriation should occur. The two acts would interfere
neither with one another nor with the originally pure pen. It would
sleep undisturbed in its own past, no matter how many such successors
went through their several appropriative acts. Each would know it as
'my' percept, each would class it as a 'conscious' fact.

Nor need their so classing it interfere in the least with their classing
it at the same time as a physical pen. Since the classing in both cases
depends upon the taking of it in one group or another of associates, if
the superseding experience were of wide enough 'span' it could think the
pen in both groups simultaneously, and yet distinguish the two groups.
It would then see the whole situation conformably to what we call 'the
representative theory of cognition,' and that is what we all
spontaneously do. As a man philosophizing 'popularly,' I believe that
what I see myself writi