t leave off with a _constitution_ behind
which there is nothing.

[61] Apply this to the case of 'book-on-table'! W. J.

[62] _Op. cit._, pp. 570, 572.

[63] _Op. cit._, pp. 568, 569.

[64] _Op. cit._, p. 570.

[65] How meaningless is the contention that in such wholes (or in
'book-on-table,' 'watch-in-pocket,' etc.) the relation is an additional
entity _between_ the terms, needing itself to be related again to each!
Both Bradley (_op. cit._, pp. 32-33) and Royce (_The World and the
Individual_, vol. I, p. 128) lovingly repeat this piece of profundity.

[66] The 'why' and the 'whence' are entirely other questions, not under
discussion, as I understand Mr. Bradley. Not how experience gets itself
born, but how it can be what it is after it is born, is the puzzle.

[67] Above, p. 52.

IV

HOW TWO MINDS CAN KNOW ONE THING[68]

In [the essay] entitled 'Does Consciousness Exist?' I have tried to show
that when we call an experience 'conscious,' that does not mean that it
is suffused throughout with a peculiar modality of being ('psychic'
being) as stained glass may be suffused with light, but rather that it
stands in certain determinate relations to other portions of experience
extraneous to itself. These form one peculiar 'context' for it; while,
taken in another context of experiences, we class it as a fact in the
physical world. This 'pen,' for example, is, in the first instance, a
bald _that_, a datum, fact, phenomenon, content, or whatever other
neutral or ambiguous name you may prefer to apply. I called it in that
article a 'pure experience.' To get classed either as a physical pen or
as some one's percept of a pen, it must assume a _function_, and that
can only happen in a more complicated world. So far as in that world it
is a stable feature, holds ink, marks paper and obeys the guidance of a
hand, it is a physical pen. That is what we mean by being 'physical,' in
a pen. So far as it is instable, on the contrary, coming and going with
the movements of my eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, continuous
with subsequent experiences of its 'having been' (in the past tense), it
is the percept of a pen in my mind. Those peculiarities are what we mean
by being 'conscious,' in a pen.

In Section VI of another [essay][69] I tried to show that the same
_that_, the same numerically identical pen of pure experience, can enter
simultaneously into many conscious contexts, or, in other words, be an
object