cerity!

[50] [For the author's criticism of Hegel's view of relations, cf. _Will
to Believe_, pp. 278-279. ED.]

[51] [Cf. A. Spir: _Denken und Wirklichkeit_, part I, bk. III, ch. IV
(containing also account of Herbart). ED.]

[52] [See above, pp. 42, 49.]

[53] Here again the reader must beware of slipping from logical into
phenomenal considerations. It may well be that we _attribute_ a certain
relation falsely, because the circumstances of the case, being complex,
have deceived us. At a railway station we may take our own train, and
not the one that fills our window, to be moving. We here put motion in
the wrong place in the world, but in its original place the motion is a
part of reality. What Mr. Bradley means is nothing like this, but rather
that such things as motion are nowhere real, and that, even in their
aboriginal and empirically incorrigible seats, relations are impossible
of comprehension.

[54] Particularly so by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, in his _Man and
the Cosmos_; by L. T. Hobhouse, in chapter XII ("The Validity of
Judgment") of his _Theory of Knowledge_; and by F. C. S. Schiller, in
his _Humanism_, essay XI. Other fatal reviews (in my opinion) are
Hodder's, in the _Psychological Review_, vol. I, [1894], p. 307; Stout's
in the _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_, 1901-2, p. 1; and
MacLennan's in [_The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods_, vol. I, 1904, p. 403].

[55] Once more, don't slip from logical into physical situations. Of
course, if the table be wet, it will moisten the book, or if it be
slight enough and the book heavy enough, the book will break it down.
But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue. The point is
whether the successive relations 'on' and 'not-on' can rationally (not
physically) hold of the same constant terms, abstractly taken. Professor
A. E. Taylor drops from logical into material considerations when he
instances color-contrast as a proof that _A_, 'as contra-distinguished
from _B_, is not the same thing as mere _A_ not in any way affected'
(_Elements of Metaphysics_, p. 145). Note the substitution, for
'related' of the word 'affected,' which begs the whole question.

[56] But "is there any sense," asks Mr. Bradley, peevishly, on p. 579,
"and if so, what sense in truth that is only outside and 'about'
things?" Surely such a question may be left unanswered.

[57] _Appearance and Reality_, second edition, pp. 575-576.

[58]