ient pause in the operations having
been reached, might lead to a serious reverse being sustained by our
forces.

"The abandonment of the Zeebrugge project does not prevent you from
co-operating to the utmost extent, compatible with your present
resources, with any offensive movement contemplated by Gen. Joffre,
and your previous instructions in this sense are in no way modified.

"The Council further thought that there were certain indications,
which should not be neglected, of German reinforcements reaching their
Armies in the Western theatre in the near future, which may lead
German Commanders to undertake a fresh attempt to force the lines you
and the French Army hold. If this movement should develop, it could
probably be better met and defeated by holding your present lines of
prepared positions than by extending the line to the Dutch frontier
and placing the Belgian Army in probably a more exposed position than
they now occupy. You may rest assured that, as they become available,
fresh troops will be sent to you with the least possible delay to
strengthen your forces as far as is practicable. The 28th Division
have already received orders to leave for France on the 14th inst."

The telegram from the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated January 2nd,
referred to in the above memorandum, ran as follows:--"The
battleship 'Formidable' was sunk this morning by a submarine in the
Channel. Information from all quarters shows that the Germans are
steadily developing an important submarine base at Zeebrugge. Unless
operations can be undertaken to clear the coast, and particularly to
capture this place, it must be recognised that the whole
transportation of troops across the Channel will be seriously and
increasingly compromised. The Admiralty are of the opinion that it
would be possible, under cover of warships, to land a large force at
Zeebrugge in conjunction with any genuine forward movement along the
shore to Ostend. They wish these views, which they have so frequently
put forward, to be placed again before the French Commander, and hope
they may receive the consideration which their urgency and importance
require."

It will be seen from this that Mr. Churchill was not in accord with
the views expressed in Lord Kitchener's memorandum.

The situation was well known to the Cabinet before the despatch of Sir
Edward Grey's telegram of December 9th. It is clear that the points
raised in the memorandum of January 9th were