was not made in 1915.
Divided counsels lead to half measures and indecisive action. Such
counsels have always had, and always will have, the most deterrent and
disadvantageous effect on any vigorous prosecution of a war, great or
small.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14TH-19TH, 1914.
For the plan sketched out in the last chapter, a certain amount of
naval co-operation was secured. The Admiralty were always strongly in
favour of my original proposal, and did not at all like the
half-hearted operation which Joffre was substituting for it. They
urged, with great force and reason, that the risks run by the ships in
co-operation on the Belgian coast were increasingly great owing to the
powerful fortifications erected by the Germans, and the presence of
enemy submarines at Zeebrugge. Whilst, therefore, those risks might
well be run in support of a real, strenuous, and powerful endeavour to
wrench the coast-line from the enemy's grasp, the Admiralty felt that
the Navy could not afford to sacrifice strength in hanging about day
after day exposed to such risks, in the sole hope of rendering some
slight help to an attack which had no great or decisive object in
view. In proof of this, I quote the following telegrams which were
received from the Admiralty. On December 20th, 1914, they wired as
follows:--
"We are receiving almost daily requests from the French for naval
support on the Belgian coast. We regret we are unable to comply. The
small vessels by themselves cannot face the new shore batteries, and
it is not justifiable to expose battleships to submarine perils unless
to support a land attack of primary importance.
"If such an attack is delivered, all the support in my
Memorandum forwarded to you through Secretary of State for War will,
of course, be afforded. I would be glad if you would explain this to
Gen. Foch, as it is painful to the officers concerned to make repeated
refusals."
A previous wire had arrived on the 18th, the last few lines of which
ran as follows:--
"It is not justifiable to expose 'Majestic' to submarine risks unless
to support a real movement, in which case every risk will be run and
ample support provided."
And before this, on the 12th, the following was received:--
"Will you please put us in communication with the French General who
will conduct the operation.... Meanwhile, all our preparations as
outlined are proceeding, ... but the serious risks to our ships
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