ich the plans sought to attain.

Those objects were not clearly defined till September, when we began
our last combined attack to attain them and practically failed.

The attitude of our War Office in failing to speed up the manufacture
of munitions of war and the practical collapse of the Russian Armies
were to some extent responsible for the lack of success of our
endeavours. But the detailment of troops and war material to the
Dardanelles was undoubtedly the chief cause.

There was no other course for me to take, under the circumstances,
than to fall in with Joffre's view; and in accordance with his plan I
agreed to take over, in conjunction with the Belgians, the whole line
from La Bassee to the sea, but only by degrees as troops became
available.

Although Joffre at the time agreed in my wish to work the northern
section entirely with the Belgian Army, it would appear that the
French Government still insisted on keeping some hold on that part of
the line with French troops.

On returning to my Headquarters I sent for Bridges, who was now my
representative with His Majesty the King of the Belgians. On the
morning of the 28th, we had a long conference on the subject of
co-operation with the Belgian Army.

I had evolved a scheme in my own mind of amalgamating the Belgian and
British Armies. I wanted to see Belgian brigades of infantry embodied
in our own Army Corps at convenient sections in the line, and to apply
the same process to the cavalry and artillery. This apparent
surrender of independence was no doubt a heavy trial to impose upon
the Belgian General Staff; but I believed it to be the surest and best
method to adopt if we wished to get the highest efforts out of the two
Armies.

When all is said, it must be acknowledged that the standard of
training and war efficiency was higher in our troops than in the
Belgian. This applied particularly to the leaders and the Staff; and,
in spite of the drastic experiences of the Belgian Army during August
and September, our own higher ranks certainly possessed a wider and
more extensive experience in the field.

It can indeed hardly be doubted that a Division composed of two
British infantry brigades and one Belgian would probably have done
more, either in attack or defence, than such a unit composed entirely
of Belgian troops.

Whatever views may be held on this point, it must be allowed that the
scheme I proposed would have ensured a much greater unity of eff