en the average
daily expenditure of 18-pdr. ammunition had amounted to 81 rounds per
gun.

In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached the enormous total
of 300 rounds daily.

A proportion of at least 25 per cent. of high-explosive shells for 13
and 18 pdrs. was included in the demands to which I have referred
above.

In a communication to the War Office on December 31st, the view was
expressed that considerably more high explosive was necessary, and the
following table was laid down as our minimum requirements to carry on
the war with any prospect of success:--

REQUIRED OUTPUT OF AMMUNITION.

Rounds per gun a day.

13-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
18-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
4.5-in. howitzer 40 (35 H.E.)
6-in. howitzer 25 (all H.E.)
60-pdr. 25 (15 H.E.)
4.7-in. gun 25 (15 H.E.)
6-in. gun 25 (all H.E.)
9.2-in. howitzer 12 (all H.E.)

It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active
operations, and should be continued even during a lull, till a reserve
of three or four times the amount laid down in war establishments had
been accumulated. To this request there was no reply until January
19th. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a
day, and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives.

This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled me to consider
means by which the several members of the Government, and the public
also, might be advised of this deplorable apathy which, if long
continued, meant the destruction of our Army.

In this letter from the War Office, of January 19th, which I have
already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the receipts which we
might rely upon up to and including the month of May. This estimate
was far below our requirements, whilst the actual receipts fell far
short of it. The actual supply in May proved to be less than one half
of the War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished for
our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to make any
reliable forecast of the condition of the ammunition supply at any
particular date. This state of uncertainty rendered the formulation of
plans for co-operating with the French most difficult, if not
impossible.

During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped