had shown wonderful results,
particularly in the matter of destroying wire entanglements.

Joffre went on to say that the Russians were in close touch with the
French factories, and were benefiting greatly by the experiments which
had been carried out. Moreover, the French were able to supply the
Russians with a considerable quantity of munitions of war. It took a
long time to transmit; but he entertained great hopes that Roumania
and Bulgaria would soon be in such sympathy with the Allies as to
permit the transport of material to Russia _via_ Salonika. The reports
he had received indicated that the Russians had sufficient ammunition
at hand, if they remained on the defensive, for six weeks.

He expressed himself as fairly satisfied with the Russian position and
outlook, and thought the Germans were being so heavily punished that
whole corps would have to be reorganised.

These views were subsequently embodied in a memorandum which I sent to
Lord Kitchener for the information of the War Cabinet.

I then arrived at an understanding with Joffre as to future plans. I
again urged strongly upon him my conviction that an advance on the
extreme north, in co-operation with our Navy, was the proper _role_
for British troops to fulfil, and went over all the old arguments. In
effect he rejected my plans again, although holding out hopes that, at
a later stage, the French Army might co-operate in such an advance.

In the absence of support from my own Government, it was hopeless to
say anything more. Joffre's plan was as follows. He meant to break
through the enemy's line from the south at Rheims and from the west at
Arras. He desired to mass as many French Corps as possible behind
these two points; therefore, at all other points of the line the
_roles_ must be twofold: (1) to economise troops as much as possible
in the trenches, so as to spare more men for action at decisive
points, and (2) to organise good local reserves to keep the enemy in
the front employed and prevent his sending troops to threatened points
in the line.

As the history of the operations during 1915 will show, this general
strategic idea was the foundation of all our efforts throughout that
year. It brought about for the British Army the Battles of Neuve
Chapelle, Ypres (second), Festubert, and Loos; and for the
French other important actions, which, although local successes, did
not result in achieving any appreciable advance towards the objectives
wh