ort.

I talked it all over at great length with Bridges, and on leaving me
he went back to put the proposal before the King of the Belgians. I
entertained little hope of getting a favourable hearing; for, although
I knew the King's lofty spirit and generous impulses would prompt him
to make any personal sacrifice to attain greater power and efficiency
for our united forces, yet I was also well aware of his difficulties
with his own Ministers.

Two days later Bridges brought me His Majesty's answer. He told me it
was possible the King himself might fall in with my suggestion. Ten
thousand rifles would have to be retained for the "inundated" line,
leaving 40,000 rifles available for the proposed amalgamation. This, I
thought, would at once render the united Armies strong enough in the
north to justify me in allowing Joffre to remove the 9th and 20th
French Corps to the points where he so much needed strength for his
own line.

This amalgamation of the British and Belgian Armies would certainly,
have effected a great economy of force and fighting power, and have
perhaps led to important results; but the scheme never came to
fruition, both because the King of the Belgians was unable to gain the
consent of his Government and because the French would not agree to
the plan. Finally, I could get no support or help from our own people
at home.

On the 27th, the French had some success at Carency (north of Arras),
capturing several German trenches and advancing the line some 500
yards.

* * * * *

In spite of the "growls" in which I have so freely indulged, the close
of 1914 yet found me in a hopeful and sanguine frame of mind.

When the state of affairs which might have been came to be compared
with the situation as it was, there was really very little reason for
pessimism. We had scored one great offensive and another great
defensive victory, and we had suffered no severe defeat.

The Germans were bound down behind their entrenchments from the North
Sea to the Swiss frontier, and under the highest trial, the Allies had
proved their ability to hold their actual lines inviolate.

Our Fleet had gained command of the sea, from which they had finally
and completely driven the German flag. The spirit of the Allied
nations was high and confident. On the other hand, had the enemy shown
more of the skill and intrepidity of those great leaders of the
past--Frederick, Napoleon, and von Moltke (wh