der a German offensive
possible--even probable--in the near future. The Germans are certainly
making new formations; the 38th Corps has been identified in Bavaria.

"3. Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. If broken, for
example, about Roye and Montdidier, the consequences for the Allies
would be of the most serious description.

"4. In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the position of
being able to assume the offensive.

"5. Because of (3) and (4), reserves are absolutely necessary.

"6. For these reasons, I am anxious for a rapid release of the Corps
north of the British line.

"7. We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and all secondary
operations must give way.

"8. Operations towards Ostend--Zeebrugge, though important,
are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion should follow rather
than precede the principal action, viz., the Collection of Reserves.

"To resume:--

(_a_) To beat the enemy it is necessary to have Reserves.

(_b_) These Reserves can only come from the north, as British
reinforcements set them free.

(_c_) The German menace, not a vain thing, makes it necessary to
collect these Reserves in the shortest possible time.

(_d_) The main object, viz., the defeat of the enemy, makes it
necessary to delay the offensive towards Ostend--Zeebrugge."

I always disagreed with these views, and remain convinced that my
plans should have been accepted and tried. I will only add, as a
further argument against embarking upon operations in other theatres
of war, that our military forces at that time, and for at least
fifteen months afterwards, were not sufficient to enable us to carry
on great operations in more than one theatre with the necessary power
and energy required for success. They could only have resulted in what
actually happened in 1915, viz., the series of feeble and on the whole
unsuccessful attempts to break through the German line in France, and
an absolute failure, compelling ultimate withdrawal of our troops, in
the Dardanelles.

I have dealt at perhaps wearisome length with the strategic
alternatives and the problems which presented themselves for solution
after the close of the First Battle of Ypres. It has been necessary to
do so in order that my countrymen may understand the situation as it
actually existed at the time, and that they may appreciate what seemed
to me conclusive reasons why greater progress