to the coast out of the question. With an
actively friendly Italy an advance through her territory would be more
practicable, but, as stated in preceding paragraph, unnecessary.

"(_g_) Through Greece to Servia, presumably _via_, Salonika, presumes
Greece to be a friendly belligerent. Probably the least objectionable
of any possible proposal, but necessitating the strict neutrality of
Bulgaria, as otherwise the land communications would be very open to
attack. A hostile Italy would also jeopardise the whole force.

"(_h_) _Gallipoli_, _Asia Minor_, _Syria_.--Any attack on Turkey would
be devoid of decisive result. In the most favourable circumstances it
could only cause the relaxation of the pressure against Russia in the
Caucasus and enable her to transfer two or three Corps to the West--a
result quite incommensurate with the effort involved. To attack Turkey
would be to play the German game and to bring about the end which
Germany had in mind when she induced Turkey to join in the war,
namely, to draw off troops from the decisive spot, which is Germany
itself.

"To sum up, my opinions are--

"(1) That the impossibility of breaking through the German line in
Flanders has not been proved, and that that operation is feasible
provided a sufficiency of high-explosive shells and of guns is
provided.

"(2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the German line,
so large a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be
withdrawn from this theatre. It is to be remembered that the Allies
are in a much better position to await the outcome of events. Time is
against Germany; she will not sit for ever behind her entrenchments,
and the Allies must be prepared with an adequate force to
strike her whenever she may attempt to break out or withdraw.

"(3) That there are no theatres, other than those in which operations
are now in progress, in which decisive results could be attained.

"I have not gone into details in considering the question of the
employment of forces in other theatres, as such operations were
considered by the M.O. Directorate of the War Office when I was
C.I.G.S., and I have no doubt that a full record of the conclusions
which were reached are filed there."

General Joffre's final opinion is expressed in a memorandum, dated
January 19th, 1915, of which the following is a summary:--

"1. I wish to call your particular attention to the following
points:--

"2. The French General Staff consi