The 2nd Brigade endeavoured to gain the old line at la Quinque Rue,
but was unable to do so, and secured a position with its right in
touch with the Meerut Brigade and in front of Festubert.
At 1 p.m. on the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig (commanding the 1st Corps)
assumed command in this area.
On the 23rd the 27th Division, which had been despatched from
England, completed its detrainment and concentrated in the area about
Arques (near St. Omer).
On the 17th I received a letter from Kitchener from which I gleaned
that the Cabinet were much perturbed by rumours of a contemplated
invasion by the enemy, which apparently emanated from the Admiralty.
The authorities at home were far from happy about the whole situation
on the Western front, and it was greatly feared that our line might
still be broken through by a determined German offensive.
I received orders to go home and consult with the Cabinet, and arrived
at Folkestone about 11 a.m. on Sunday the 20th. Lord Kitchener met me
there with his motor and we drove together to Walmer Castle, where the
Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) was then staying. I had not seen
Kitchener since our memorable meeting at Paris, early in September,
but he met me in the most friendly manner, and said many kind things
about our work in France, of which he clearly appreciated the
difficulties. We discussed the situation fully _en route_, and I
remember his putting many questions to me about all the principal
members of the Headquarters Staff. Whilst assuring him of my entire
satisfaction with each and all of them, I reminded him that, if any
fault was to be found, I and no one else was responsible.
In this and many subsequent conversations of a similar kind, I always
maintained that a Commander-in-Chief can only be held in contempt who
allows any member of his staff, or, indeed, any officer under his
orders, to bear blame which must always most properly belong to _him_
and to _him alone_. A chief in supreme command has always the
absolute power of replacing any officer who fails in his
duty. To _him_ comes the principal credit and reward when things go
well, and to _him_ and him alone must the blame be apportioned when
they do not. Until any officer under him is found by _him_ to be unfit
for his position, it is contrary to all efficient discipline to allow
such officer to be censured or removed by any outside authority.
This principle is one of the most sacred traditions of the British
Army.
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