ral Grosetti) to provide for mutual support and
co-operation had been complete.
As our great aim was now to reduce the enemy's machine-gun fire, I
directed Smith-Dorrien to send his pack artillery, which had recently
been given him, close down behind the trenches and dig them well in.
De Maud'huy's attack north of Arras was begun on the 16th by a heavy
artillery bombardment. The infantry attack followed on the 17th, but
the results were disappointing, although a little ground was gained
near Notre Dame de Lorette. Some slight progress was made by the
French 21st Corps.
I tried to see Foch, but he was away from his Headquarters with de
Maud'huy. I sent Henry Wilson after him to explain my views, namely,
that our present plan must be modified, owing largely to the fact that
we had considerably under-estimated the enemy's strength, particularly
in the matter of machine guns. Foch sent Wilson back to tell
me that he agreed in thinking that the present operations had not
proved a success. He proposed to break them off as soon as we could
reconsider our arrangements. He begged me, however, to continue
demonstrating all along my front as much as possible, with a view to
supporting the attack upon which de Maud'huy was now embarked.
It was at this time that one of the many instances occurred of the
evils which attend divided command. There was undoubtedly a great
opportunity on and about December 18th for a powerful attack opposite
Wytschaete. I proposed to mass the 16th French and 2nd British Corps
at this point, when I discovered that the 16th Corps was practically
melting away on my left flank. Two brigades had been despatched to the
north, and other units had been sent away to support de Maud'huy's
attack on Arras. I was in complete ignorance of these moves until they
were accomplished facts. I therefore had to give up all idea of a
joint attack on any large scale for the present, and issued orders to
Corps Commanders enjoining them to demonstrate on their immediate
front, to keep the enemy occupied and seize any opportunity which
might offer to capture hostile trenches.
Colonel Thomson (liaison officer with General de Castelnau) told me
that the 2nd French Army had made some progress, the first line of the
enemy trenches near Albert had been taken and the ground made good.
Progress was also made near Roye.
Captain Spiers (11th Hussars), who was now my liaison officer with
General de Maud'huy, came to me. He to
|