at the extra troops were asked for.

Inasmuch, however, as such a situation would have forced upon the
enemy the necessity of holding a dangerous and exposed salient which
could be reached on the north side by our guns from the Fleet, it is
more than possible that he would have effected such a retirement as
would have considerably shortened our line.

(3) This contention is disputed; but even if it were true, it is no
sound military argument against embarking on an operation which
promised such valuable results.

(4) There is a complete answer to this objection. Some two or three
months later, large trainloads of ammunition--heavy, medium, and
light--passed by the rear of the Army in France _en route_ to
Marseilles for shipment to the Dardanelles.

(5) The best possible means of warding off an attack is to take a
strong and powerful initiative.

I cannot characterise these reasons for rejecting my plans as other
than illogical, and I feel sure they must really have appeared so to
their authors.

Perhaps the true explanation which underlay all this is to be found in
the following Memorandum of the War Council of January 9th, 1915. It
runs as follows:--

THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING BRITISH FORCES IN A DIFFERENT THEATRE
THAN THAT IN WHICH THEY ARE NOW USED.

"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in
reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the conclusion
that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for
British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this
should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion
and required armed support. It was also realised that, should the
offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and
back to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. It
was thought that, after another failure by Germany to force the lines
of defence held by the French Army and yours, the military situation
in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of
stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break
through into France, while at the same time the German defences would
be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss
of life and the expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided.
In these circumstances, it was considered desirable to find some other
theatre where such obstructions to advance would be less pronounced,
and