excuses used as a veil to
screen the disinclination of the British Government to taking a firm
stand against the attitude adopted by the French. But there was
something more.

Lord Kitchener's objections can be easily answered. They may be
generally stated thus:--

(1) That the seizure from the Germans of this strip of sea coast
would not be an adequate return for the heavy losses likely to be
incurred in the operation.

(2) That the line then to be held would be unduly extended.

(3) That the reinforcement of the additional troops
demanded "would only be supplied at a considerable dislocation of
the organisation of the future reinforcements to be sent you."

(4) That the supply of gun ammunition on the scale demanded would
be impossible.

(5) That embarking on such an enterprise would prejudice our
power of resisting a possible German counter-offensive in the
immediate future.

My answer to (1) is this: Had we been in possession of the Belgian
coast-line between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier in the early part
of 1915, and had we maintained it to the end of the war, the Germans
would have been deprived in a great measure of the power they have
exercised throughout with such success, to prosecute their submarine
campaign. Any price we might have had to pay in the way of losses
would have been well worth the object attained.

In a lesser degree this may be said of the enemy's aircraft
enterprises. I claim that the naval history of this war clearly bears
out my contention.

As to (2), the extent of the line to be held would depend upon the
degree of success attained by the operations. If we had been able to
make good our advance from the left flank (between Nieuport and
Dixmude) by means of powerful naval support from the sea, the least we
should have effected would have been to clear the Germans out of the
triangle Nieuport--Dixmude--Zeebrugge.

If the operation had then to be suspended, we should have had to hold
the line Dixmude--Zeebrugge instead of Dixmude--Nieuport. In actual
distance the former space is about double the latter. But our position
at Zeebrugge would have afforded a large measure of naval support,
and the country to the south-west of that place lends itself
to inundations. This would have enabled us to occupy the north-eastern
portion of the line in much less strength. Further, it was just in
anticipation of such a necessity th