litary, the Council came to the conclusion that the advantages to be
obtained from such an advance at the present moment would not be
commensurate with the heavy losses involved, as well as the extension
that would be thus caused to the lines of the Allies in
Northern Flanders.
"The Council was also influenced in this conclusion by the following
considerations. The first of these was that the reinforcements of 50
battalions of Territorial troops, which you considered indispensable,
could only be supplied at a considerable dislocation of the
organisation of the future reinforcements to be sent to you. It must
be borne in mind that the original organisation of the Territorial
Force included no provision for drafts. Great difficulties have
already been encountered in providing drafts for the 24 battalions
already in your command; and, although arrangements for the necessary
machinery to create a special reserve for the Territorials are in
hand, it would not at present be possible to supply 50 more battalions
with drafts without an entire reorganisation of the forces allotted to
Home Defence, and this would modify the programme for reinforcements
to join our Army in the future.
"The second consideration was that it is impossible at the present
time to maintain a sufficient supply of gun ammunition on the scale
which you considered necessary for offensive operations. Every effort
is being made in all parts of the world to obtain an unlimited supply
of ammunition; but, as you are well aware, the result is still far
from being sufficient to maintain the large number of guns which you
now have under your command adequately supplied with ammunition for
offensive purposes.
"You have pointed out that offensive operations under the new
conditions created by this war require a vast expenditure of artillery
ammunition, which may, for even 10 or 20 days, necessitate the supply
of 50 or 100 rounds per gun per day being available, and that, unless
the reserve can be accumulated to meet expenditure of this
sort, it is unwise to embark on extensive offensive operations against
the enemy in trenches. It is, of course, almost impossible to
calculate with any accuracy how long offensive operations, once
undertaken, may last before the object is attained; but it is evident
that the breaking off of such operations before accomplishment, owing
to the want of artillery ammunition, and not on account of a
successful termination or a conven
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