and
seen in its light, in so far its action flows from an internal and not
an external necessity. In so far, on the other hand, as we are
determined by the affections of the body, ideas in which the nature of
our own body and the nature of other things are confused together, in
so far we are determined by an external necessity. Or to put the same
thing in what has been shown to be merely another way of expression,
in so far as we are determined by pure intelligence we are free, but
in so far as we are determined by opinion and imagination we are
slaves.

From these premises it is easy to see what form the opposition of
reason and passion must necessarily take with Spinoza. The passions
belong to our nature as finite; they are grounded on, or rather are
but another form of inadequate ideas; but we are free only in so far
as our ideas either immediately are, or can be made, adequate. Our
idea of God is adequate _ex vi termini_; our ideas of the affections
of our body are inadequate, but can be made adequate in so far as they
are referred to the idea of God. And as the idea of God is purely
affirmative, this reference to the idea of God implies the elimination
of the negative element from the ideas of the affections of the body,
"for nothing that is positive in a false idea is removed by the
presence of truth as such."[54] Brought into contact with the idea of
God, all ideas become true and adequate, by the removal of the
negative or false element in them. The idea of God is, as it were, the
touchstone which distinguishes the gold from the dross. It enables us
to detect the higher spiritual element in the natural passions, and to
sever the element belonging to that pure love of self which is
identical with the love of perfection from the elements belonging to
that impure love of our own finite individuality as such which is
identical with the love of evil.

Implicit difficulties.

The imperfection in Spinoza's development of this principle has
already been indicated. It is in fact the same imperfection which runs
through his whole system. Just as he supposed that the ideas of finite
things were at once made consistent with the idea of the infinite when
he had named them modes, so here his conception of the change through
which selfish natural desire must pass in order to become spiritual is
far too superficial and external. Hence he has no sym