w York. It was expected that the two would meet from time to
time; and, should combined action be advisable, Rodgers had authority
to unite them under his broad pendant for that purpose. The object of
this movement was to protect the commerce of the country, which at
this time was expected to be returning in great numbers from the
Spanish peninsula; whither had been hurried every available ship, and
every barrel of flour in store, as soon as the news of the approaching
embargo of April 4 became public. "The great bulk of our returning
commerce," wrote the secretary, "will make for the ports between the
Chesapeake and our eastern extremities; and, in the protection to be
afforded, such ports claim particular attention."

The obvious comment on this disposition is that protection to the
incoming ships would be most completely afforded, not by the local
presence of either of these squadrons, but by the absence of the
enemy. This absence was best insured by beating him, if met; and in
the then size of the British Halifax fleet it was possible that a
detachment sent from it might be successfully engaged by the joint
division, though not by either squadron singly. The other adequate
alternative was to force the enemy to keep concentrated, and so to
cover as small a part as might be of the homeward path of the
scattered American trade. This also was best effected by uniting our
own ships. Without exaggerating the danger to the American squadrons,
needlessly exposed in detail by the Department's plan, the object in
view would have been attained as surely, and at less risk, by keeping
all the vessels together, even though they were retained between
Boston Bay and the Capes of the Chesapeake for the local defence of
commerce. In short, as was to be expected from the antecedents of the
Government, the scheme was purely and narrowly defensive; there was
not in it a trace of any comprehension of the principle that offence
is the surest defence. The opening words of its letter defined the
full measure of its understanding. "It has been judged expedient so to
employ our public armed vessels, as to afford to our returning
commerce all possible protection." It may be added, that to station on
the very spot where the merchant vessels were flocking in return,
divisions inferior to that which could be concentrated against them,
was very bad strategy; drawing the enemy by a double motive to the
place whence his absence was particularly desi