direction for what is
not gained, or may even be lost, in another. The Navy Department, when
hostilities were imminent, addressed inquiries to several prominent
officers as to the best means of employing the very small total force
available. The question involved the direction of effort, as well as
the method; but as regards the former of these, the general routes
followed by British commerce, and the modes of protecting it, were so
far understood as to leave not much room for differences of opinion.

Rodgers may have been unconsciously swayed by the natural bias of an
officer whose seniority would insure him a division, if the
single-cruiser policy did not prevail. Of the replies given, however,
his certainly was the one most consonant with sound military
views.[416] Send a small squadron, of two or three frigates and a
sloop, to cruise on the coast of the British Islands, and send the
light cruisers to the West Indies; for, though he did not express it,
in the gentle breezes and smooth seas of the tropics small cruisers
have a much better chance to avoid capture by big ships than in the
heavy gales of the North Atlantic. This much may be termed the
distinctly offensive part of Rodgers' project. For the defensive,
employ the remainder of the frigates, singly or in squadron, to guard
our own seaboard; either directly, by remaining off the coast, or by
taking position in the track of the trade between Great Britain and
the St. Lawrence. Irrespective of direct captures there made, this
course would contribute to protect the access to home ports, by
drawing away the enemy's ships of war to cover their own threatened
commerce. Alike in the size of his foreign squadron, and in the touch
of uncertainty as to our own coasts, "singly or in squadron," Rodgers
reflected the embarrassment of a man whose means are utterly
inadequate to the work he wishes to do. One does not need to be a
soldier or a seaman to comprehend the difficulty of making ends meet
when there is not enough to go round.

Decatur and Bainbridge, whose written opinions are preserved, held
views greatly modified from those of Rodgers, or even distinctly
opposed to them. "The plan which appears to me best calculated for our
little navy to annoy the trade of Great Britain," wrote Decatur,[417]
"would be to send them out distant from our own coast, singly, or not
more than two frigates in company, without specific instructions;
relying upon the enterprise of their