ports, mostly armed. Without
apprehension of attack, not because he trusted to the neutrality of
the port but because he thought his destination secret, the English
commodore had not anchored with a view to battle.

It so happened that at the moment of sailing from Brest one of the
ships intended for the West Indies was transferred to Suffren's
squadron. She consequently had not water enough for the longer voyage,
and this with other reasons determined Suffren also to anchor at
Porto Praya. On the 16th of April, five days after Johnstone, he made
the island early in the morning and stood for the anchorage, sending a
coppered ship ahead to reconnoitre. Approaching from the eastward, the
land for some time hid the English squadron; but at quarter before
nine the advance ship, the "Artesien," signalled that enemy's ships
were anchored in the bay. The latter is open to the southward, and
extends from east to west about a mile and a half; the conditions are
such that ships usually lie in the northeast part, near the shore
(Plate XIII).[169] The English were there, stretching irregularly in a
west-northwest line. Both Suffren and Johnstone were surprised, but
the latter more so; and the initiative remained with the French
officer. Few men were fitter, by natural temper and the teaching of
experience, for the prompt decision required. Of ardent disposition
and inborn military genius, Suffren had learned, in the conduct of
Boscawen toward the squadron of De la Clue,[170] in which he had
served, not to lay weight upon the power of Portugal to enforce
respect for her neutrality. He knew that this must be the squadron
meant for the Cape of Good Hope. The only question for him was whether
to press on to the Cape with the chance of getting there first, or to
attack the English at their anchors, in the hope of so crippling them
as to prevent their further progress. He decided for the latter; and
although the ships of his squadron, not sailing equally well, were
scattered, he also determined to stand in at once, rather than lose
the advantage of a surprise. Making signal to prepare for action at
anchor, he took the lead in his flag-ship, the "Heros," of
seventy-four guns, hauled close round the southeast point of the bay,
and stood for the English flag-ship (f). He was closely followed by
the "Hannibal," seventy-four (line a b); the advance ship "Artesien"
(c), a sixty-four, also stood on with him; but the two rear ships were
still f