ed till twenty minutes before four P.M., when, finding he could
not escape attack on the enemy's terms, Hughes hauled his wind on the
port tack and awaited it (C). Whether by his own fault or not, he was
now in the worst possible position, waiting for an attack by a
superior force at its pleasure. The rear ship of his line, the
"Exeter," was not closed up; and there appears no reason why she
should not have been made the van, by forming on the starboard tack,
and thus bringing the other ships up to her.

[Illustration: Pl. XIV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. FEB. 17. 1782.]

The method of Suffren's attack (C) is differently stated by him and by
Hughes, but the difference is in detail only; the main facts are
certain. Hughes says the enemy "steered down on the rear of our line
in an irregular double line-abreast," in which formation they
continued till the moment of collision, when "three of the enemy's
ships in the first line bore right down upon the 'Exeter,' while four
more of their second line, headed by the 'Heros,' in which M. de
Suffren had his flag, hauled _along the outside of the first line_
toward our centre. At five minutes past four the enemy's three ships
began their fire upon the 'Exeter,' which was returned by her and her
second ahead; the action became general from our rear to our centre,
the commanding ship of the enemy, with three others of their second
line, leading down on our centre, yet never advancing farther than
opposite to the 'Superbe,' our centre ship, with little or no wind and
some heavy rain during the engagement. Under these circumstances, the
enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours,
as the van of our line, consisting of the 'Monmouth,' 'Eagle,'
'Burford,' and 'Worcester,' could not be brought into action without
tacking on the enemy," for which there was not enough wind.

Here we will leave them, and give Suffren's account of how he took up
his position. In his report to the Minister of Marine he says:--

"I should have destroyed the English squadron, less by superior
numbers than by the advantageous disposition in which I attacked
it. I attacked the rear ship and stood along the English line as
far as the sixth. I thus made three of them useless, so that we
were twelve against six. I began the fight at half-past three in
the afternoon, taking the lead and making signal to form line as
best could be done; without that I would not have en