derstanding and estrangement of two gallant officers, should
not be permitted to occur. It is the business of a chief to provide
against such misapprehensions by most careful previous explanation of
both the letter and spirit of his plans. Especially is this so at sea,
where smoke, slack wind, and intervening rigging make signals hard to
read, though they are almost the only means of communication. This was
Nelson's practice; nor was Suffren a stranger to the idea.
"Dispositions well concerted with those who are to carry them out are
needed," he wrote to D'Estaing, three years before. The excuse which
may be pleaded for those who followed him, and engaged, cannot avail
for the rear ships, and especially not for the second in command, who
knew Suffren's plans. He should have compelled the rear ships to take
position to leeward, leading himself, if necessary. There was wind
enough; for two captains actually engaged to leeward, one of them
without orders, acting, through the impulse of his own good will and
courage, on Nelson's saying, "No captain can do very wrong who places
his ship alongside that of an enemy." He received the special
commendation of Suffren, in itself an honor and a reward. Whether the
failure of so many of his fellows was due to inefficiency, or to a
spirit of faction and disloyalty, is unimportant to the general
military writer, however interesting to French officers jealous for
the honor of their service. Suffren's complaints, after several
disappointments, became vehement.

"My heart," wrote he, "is wrung by the most general defection. I
have just lost the opportunity of destroying the English
squadron.... All--yes, all--might have got near, since we were
to windward and ahead, and none did so. Several among them had
behaved bravely in other combats. I can only attribute this
horror to the wish to bring the cruise to an end, to ill-will,
and to ignorance; for I dare not suspect anything worse. The
result has been terrible. I must tell you, Monseigneur, that
officers who have been long at the Isle of France are neither
seamen nor military men. Not seamen, for they have not been at
sea; and the trading temper, independent and insubordinate, is
absolutely opposed to the military spirit."

This letter, written after his fourth battle with Hughes, must be
taken with allowance. Not only does it appear that Suffren himself,
hurried away on this last occasio