gaged. At
four I made signal to three ships to double on the enemy's rear,
and to the squadron to approach within pistol-shot. This signal,
though repeated, was not executed. I did not _myself_ give the
example, in order that I might hold in check the three van
ships, which by tacking would have doubled on me. However,
except the 'Brilliant,' which doubled on the rear, no ship was
as close as mine, nor received as many shots."

The principal point of difference in the two accounts is, that Suffren
asserts that his flag-ship passed along the whole English line, from
the rear to the sixth ship; while Hughes says the French divided into
two lines, which, upon coming near, steered, one on the rear, the
other on the centre, of his squadron. The latter would be the better
manoeuvre; for if the leading ship of the attack passed, as Suffren
asserts, along the enemy's line from the rear to the sixth, she should
receive in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to
cripple her and confuse her line. Suffren also notes the intention to
double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward of it. Two of the
French did take this position. Suffren further gives his reason for
not closing with his own ship, which led; but as those which followed
him went no nearer, Hughes's attention was not drawn to his action.

The French commodore was seriously, and it would seem justly, angered
by the inaction of several of his captains. Of the second in command
he complained to the minister: "Being at the head, I could not well
see what was going on in the rear. I had directed M. de Tromelin to
make signals to ships which might be near him; he only repeated my own
without having them carried out." This complaint was wholly justified.
On the 6th of February, ten days before the fight, he had written to
his second as follows:--

"If we are so fortunate as to be to windward, as the English are
not more than eight, or at most nine, my intention is to double
on their rear. Supposing your division to be in the rear, you
will see by your position what number of ships will overlap the
enemy's line, and you will make signal to them to double[174]
[that is, to engage on the lee side].... In any case, I beg you
to order to your division the manoeuvres which you shall think
best fitted to assure the success of the action. The capture of
Trincomalee and that of Negapatam, and perhaps